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“And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core 
principle that everybody should have some basic security when it 
comes to their health care.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
If healthcare reform had excluded from its “basic security” cardiac 
catheterizations, Caesarian section deliveries, or knee replacement 
surgeries from the services to be covered by either public or private 
health insurance, the public likely would have been both bewildered 
 
* H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law and 
Bioethics Associate, University of Kentucky College of Medicine.  Many thanks to 
the participants in the Medicaid Matters workshop for their insights and 
encouragement, and to Kathryn Swany for her research assistance.  Thanks always 
DT. 
 1. President Barack Obama, “On Behalf of My Mother,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(Mar. 23, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/23/behalf-my-
mother (signing statement at the signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act). 
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and outraged.  It would have been bewildered because the goal of 
healthcare reform was to create near-universal insurance coverage to 
facilitate equal access to healthcare, and outraged because these 
procedures are some of the most frequently performed inpatient 
surgical procedures in the United States.2  If access to care was the 
goal, then covering the procedures most often performed would seem 
to ensure that various populations receive equitable access to care.  
Nevertheless, Congress explicitly excluded3 a procedure that current 
statistics indicate one in three women of childbearing age will need: 
abortion.4  Not even medically necessary abortions, where the fetus is 
not viable, or where the pregnant woman’s health is endangered, are 
rescued from the pariah designation imposed by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).5 
Trading healthcare reform for women’s reproductive health was 
not an unexpected occurrence.  In 2010, I predicted that Congress was 
likely to exclude poor women from the sweeping access to care that 
the nascent health reform bill appeared poised to provide.6  The ACA 
was an expansive legislative effort that attempted to level the playing 
field for healthcare access in the United States; in many areas, the 
ACA is likely to succeed.7  But by excluding one of the most common 
 
 2. FastStats: Inpatient Surgery, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/insurg.htm (last updated May 30, 2013). 
 3. See Robert Pear, Negotiating to 60 Votes, Compromise by Compromise, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at A37 (reporting that Senator Harry Reid dropped abortion 
coverage from the reform bill to appease Senator Ben Nelson, the anti-abortion 
Democrat from Nebraska). 
 4. CDC’s Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Data_Stats/Abortion.htm 
(last updated Nov. 21, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, 784,507 legal abortions were 
reported to the CDC).  The Guttmacher Institute reports significantly higher 
numbers for legal induced abortions (medical and surgical), with the most recent 
number being over 1.2 million abortions in 2008. Facts on Induced Abortion in the 
United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf. 
 5. See Rachel Rebouché & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The 
Intersection of Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L. J. 983 (2012) 
(discussing the “collision course” created by the ACA between genetic testing and 
abortion). 
 6. See Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 783 (noting that Congress was poised to incorporate the Hyde 
Amendment into healthcare reform legislation). 
 7. The “ACA” is two separate laws: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.), which amended multiple 
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surgical procedures from its sweep, the ACA has traded women’s 
reproductive rights for everyone else’s gain in medical care.8 
Despite this compromise, the ACA contains many provisions that 
will better women’s health by improving their access to consistent 
care and their status in insurance markets.9  Such provisions include 
the elimination of preexisting condition clauses,10 prohibitions on 
rescission,11 open access to obstetric and gynecologic services,12 
required maternity and newborn care,13 and the prohibition of 
lifetime caps on insurance coverage.14  These private insurance 
strictures will improve the health of women regardless of their 
marital, employment, socioeconomic, or other statuses, but especially 
women of low economic means who historically have had trouble 
accessing consistent healthcare of any kind.15  The irony is that these 
same women are the most likely to suffer unintended pregnancies and 
to seek abortions to terminate such pregnancies, which neither public 
nor private insurance will cover under the ACA, except in extremely 
limited circumstances.16 
 
titles of Public Law 111-148.  This Article refers to the two acts collectively as the 
ACA, which has become common shorthand for both laws, as they are a functional 
unit. 
 8. See Pear, supra note 3. 
 9. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception, and the ACA: The 
Realignment of Women’s Health, 55 HOW. L. J. 731 (2012) (explaining theoretical 
approaches to women’s health and providing context for separating abortion from 
other women’s health services with a focus on the ACA’s “amplification” of this 
separation); see also Impact of Health Reform on Women’s Access to Coverage and 
Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 2012), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/ 
upload/7987-02.pdf. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
 11. Id. § 300gg-12. 
 12. Id. § 300gg-19a. 
 13. Id. § 18022. 
 14. Id. § 300gg-11. 
 15. Women in urban areas (and in the South and Southwest) have the highest 
unintended pregnancy rates. See National Reproductive Health Profile, 
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/datacenter/profiles/US.jsp (follow 
“Pregnancies, Births and Abortions” hyperlink) (last visited July 3, 2013).  The 
reproductive health issues in urban areas are so pressing that the National Institute 
for Reproductive Health started an initiative dubbed the Urban Initiative for 
Reproductive Health to focus on the health needs of urban populations. See 
generally URB. INITIATIVE FOR REPROD. HEALTH, http://www.urbaninitiative.org/ 
(last visited July 3, 2013). 
 16. Section 1303 of the ACA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023, restricts many aspects 
of funding for abortion. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18023(a)(1)(A) (private insurers may 
cover abortion services as part of essential health benefits when they participate as 
“qualifying health plans” in the insurance exchanges); § 18023(a)(1)(B) 
(incorporating by reference the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on use of federal 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
1360 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
This limitation may be mitigated by the regulatory determination 
as to which preventive services should be covered free of copayment 
requirements by insurers.17  The ACA commands that private insurers 
must provide coverage of “essential health benefits,” which were to 
include certain women’s health services,18 with no required 
copayment.19  Working at the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services’ behest, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found 
that contraception is an essential health benefit, extending the reach 
of the ACA’s access goals to millions of women for whom 
contraception was prohibitively expensive.20  Thus, the ACA may 
significantly expand coverage for, and use of, contraceptives, thereby 
lowering the number of abortions that women of any background will 
seek, but especially those for whom rates of abortion have been rising 
(the poor, African-Americans, and Latinas).21  This provision is in 
jeopardy because secular, private employers have challenged its 
constitutionality, claiming that the ACA restricts their exercise of 
religious freedom.22 
Despite the advance in women’s healthcare that the push for 
covering contraceptives represents, treating women’s medical care as 
 
funding for the Department of Health and Human Services to fund abortions except 
in cases of threats to the life of the pregnant woman, rape and incest); id. § 
18023(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting use of federal tax credits for purchase of insurance 
through exchanges for abortions); id. § 18023(a)(2)(B) (prohibiting use of federal 
funds for abortion by demanding that health plans segregate of personal funds from 
federal funds such as tax credits for the Exchanges). 
 17. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential 
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation; Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 12834-
01 (Feb. 25, 2013). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C) (requiring that the “health care needs of diverse 
segments of the population, including women” will be considered in setting the terms 
of each of the essential health benefits). 
 19. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited July 1, 2013). 
 20. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR 
WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 109–16 (2011), available at http://books.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record_id=13181.  
 21. Unintended Pregnancy Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/UnintendedPregnancy/index. 
htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2013) (citing statistics regarding disparities in unintended 
pregnancy rates and abortion rates). 
 22. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–6294, 2013 WL 3216103 
(10th Cir. June 27, 2013); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception 
Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012) (providing a succinct 
explanation of the issues related to this First Amendment litigation, and explaining 
why the so-called contraception mandate is not a violation of anyone’s First 
Amendment rights). 
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a political trading card diminishes the status of women in the polity 
and has retrograde ramifications for their health.  Abortion is a 
medical procedure, but the political rhetoric of “choice” versus “life” 
seems to have co-opted the hard fact that women sometimes need 
abortions for medical reasons, and prohibiting access to abortions, 
even by the indirect method of funding, ultimately can endanger 
women’s lives.23  This is especially true for the low-income women 
who rely on Medicaid24 or who will receive the tax subsidies available 
for purchasing private insurance in the exchanges (a line that will 
undoubtedly be fluid).25  The great paradox of the ACA is that it 
creates substantial new obstacles to reproductive health at the same 
moment that it attempts to improve access for women’s healthcare. 
This Article will scrutinize the separation of abortion from other 
aspects of women’s health through the vehicle of the ACA.  Part I 
will examine briefly why the fragmented nature of American 
healthcare has facilitated the separation of abortion from women’s 
health, despite the fact that abortion is a medically necessary 
procedure for many women.  To that end, this Part will explore the 
disjointed history of access to medicine juxtaposed against the 
strangely non-woman-centric nature of the fundamental rights at play 
in reproductive health.  Part II will provide an overview of the ACA 
to explain the spending elements of the ACA that magnify greatly the 
limits on access to abortion in both public and private health 
insurance programs.  Part III will summarize the jurisprudential 
changes resulting from National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius26 and analyze three ways in which NFIB affects women’s 
health under the ACA. 
 
 23. See B. Jessie Hill, What Is The Meaning of Health? Constitutional 
Implications of Defining “Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445 (2012) (discussing the difficulty of 
grounding this problem in constitutional arguments). 
 24. Some women are already covered by Medicaid by virtue of being pregnant or 
being parents. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2012).  For childless women, 
Medicaid coverage will be available in states that opt in to the ACA’s expansion of 
Medicaid as of January 1, 2014. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; see also Rachel Benson Gold, 
Insurance Coverage and Abortion Incidence: Information and Misinformation, 13 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4, 9 (2010) (explaining how the expansion of the Hyde 
Amendment will affect Medicaid enrollees and especially enrollees in states that 
prohibit use of state funds for abortion services). 
 25. 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
 26. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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I.  HISTORICAL ANACHRONISMS 
The ACA’s reliance on existing fractured finance and delivery 
systems facilitated the separation of reproductive care from the 
remainder of the law.  This Part will consider the role of historical 
paths in American healthcare to contextualize how healthcare reform 
could exclude a commonly performed, non-experimental medical 
procedure from its otherwise patient-protective approach to 
healthcare access.  It will then review the underlying rights that 
should protect women from the ACA’s segregation of reproductive 
care.  Studying these structural elements of American healthcare 
helps to clarify how pre-existing systemic deficiencies facilitated the 
amplification of the Hyde Amendment, which will be explored in Part 
II. 
A. Abortion Is Healthcare 
Women’s sexual health is a beacon for political controversy, and 
the ACA has been no exception.  Therefore, it is important to 
highlight this fact: abortion is a form of medical care for women.27  
Pregnancies may be terminated either surgically or by oral 
medication; both situations require medically trained personnel.28  
The medical assistance necessary for abortion both helps to define it 
as healthcare for women and increases the complexity of its 
regulation, as healthcare providers are licensed by each state in which 
they provide medical services and are subject to the special rules that 
often attend abortion.29  Abortion may be performed for a number of 
 
 27. The 2012 election cycle made this abundantly clear, with federal congressional 
and presidential candidates making statements that abortion was never necessary to 
save the life of a pregnant woman. See, e.g., Liz Goodwin, Congressman Says 
Abortions Never Necessary to Save Life of Mother, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/congressman-says-abortions-never-necessary-
save-life-mother-175130900--election.html.  Doctors swiftly responded to clarify that 
such statements were political, not medical, and that abortion is often medically 
required to protect women’s health. Response to Politicians’ Inaccurate Abortion 
Comments, AM. CONGRESS OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/News_Room/News_Releases/2012/Response_to_
Politicians_Inaccurate_Abortion_Comments.  For example, ectopic pregnancies 
occur “in 1 in every 40 to 1 in every 100 pregnancies,” arguably threaten the life of a 
pregnant woman, and would be covered by Medicaid. Ectopic Pregnancy, MEDLINE 
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000895.htm (last updated 
Mar. 22, 2013). 
 28. Carol Sanger, About Abortion: The Complications of the Category, 54 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 849, 852 (2012) (describing the medical nature of abortion). 
 29. Many of the restrictions on abortion were made possible by the decision in 
Casey, discussed further below. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] WITH LIBERTY AND ACCESS FOR SOME 1363 
medical reasons, such as ectopic pregnancy, fetal abnormality, life- 
and health-threatening pregnancy-related complications (such as 
blood clots), or incomplete spontaneous miscarriage.30  This 
recognition was a foundational element of the initial push for 
decriminalizing abortion in the 1960s, which came not only from 
women’s rights organizations but also from the medical profession.31  
Over time, the narrative of women’s medical need for abortion has 
been lost both in the law and in the public conversation.32  But the fact 
that abortion is a medical procedure, and thus part of the 
constellation of women’s healthcare, remains. 
Abortion’s medical status is reflected in widespread private 
insurance coverage of abortion, relevant here because of the changes 
that the ACA has wrought.  Prior to the ACA, an estimated eighty-
seven percent of private insurance plans covered abortion.33  This 
coverage is consistent with insurers’ predilection for covering non-
experimental, medically necessary procedures.34  Though Medicaid 
generally follows the same pattern, it long has been subject to 
political pressures that alter its otherwise comprehensive coverage of 
medically necessary care.35  Thus, as will be discussed further below, 
Medicaid long has restricted federal funds from being directed to 
abortion services.36  This coverage disparity contributes to the ever-
 
 30. See, e.g., Andreea A. Creanga et al., Trends in Ectopic Pregnancy Mortality in 
the United States: 1980–2007, 117 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 837, 837 (2011).  The 
vast majority of late-term abortions are performed for medical reasons. See Brief of 
the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 10–15, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-
380, 1382), 2006 WL 2867888 at *17–29. 
 31. See Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–
75 (1992) (describing Roe’s grounding in the therapeutic concept of abortion). 
 32. See Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative Interference with the Patient–
Physician Relationship, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557 (2012) (reminding politicians 
that medical care does not benefit from political, non-scientific intervention); see also 
Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion 
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 391–93 (2013) (describing the roots of the abortion 
movement in the “therapeutic” need for doctors to provide abortions to women). 
 33. The data is slightly out of date, but it has not been updated. See Adam 
Sonfield et al., U.S. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives and the Impact of 
Contraceptive Coverage Mandates, 2002, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH 72, 76 (2004). 
 34. Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical 
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992) (discussing health insurers’ role in assessing 
which medical procedures are appropriate for payment and thus appropriate for 
treatment). 
 35. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text. 
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widening gap in care between poor women and women with financial 
resources. 
The federal Medicaid payment restriction has pushed many state 
courts to consider the place of abortion under state constitutions.  
Thus, thirteen states have recognized, as a matter of state 
constitutional law, that abortion is a medically necessary procedure 
requiring funding for poor women.37  Presented with challenges to 
restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions, the courts generally 
have held that poor women cannot be forced to suffer health-
jeopardizing pregnancies by virtue of the state’s interest in life.38  
 
 37. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf (last updated July 1, 
2013). 
 38. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (holding that the 
New Jersey state constitution protected poor women’s funding of abortion for 
“medically necessary” abortions).  The court wrote:  
[T]here [is no] fundamental right to funding for an abortion.  The right to 
choose whether to have an abortion, however, is a fundamental right of all 
pregnant women, including those entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for 
necessary medical treatment.  As to that group of women, the challenged 
statute discriminates between those for whom medical care is necessary for 
childbirth and those for whom an abortion is medically necessary.  Under 
[the statute] those needing abortions receive funds only when their lives are 
at stake.  By granting funds when life is at risk, but withholding them when 
health is endangered, the statute denies equal protection to those women 
entitled to necessary medical services under Medicaid. 
Id. at 934.  The court continued, 
Although that is a legitimate state interest, at no point in a pregnancy may it 
outweigh the superior interest in the life and health of the mother.  Yet the 
funding restriction gives priority to potential life at the expense of maternal 
health.  From a different perspective, the statute deprives indigent women 
“of a governmental benefit for which they are otherwise eligible, solely 
because they have attempted to exercise a constitutional right.”   
Id. at 935 (citation omitted); see also Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost 
Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002).  The Simat court wrote:  
Refusing abortions and thus preventing administration of the needed 
therapy for seriously ill women may promote childbirth and protect the 
fetus, but in some cases it will undoubtedly destroy the health and perhaps 
eventually the life of the mother.  In such a situation, the state is not simply 
influencing a woman’s choice but actually conferring the privilege of 
treatment on one class and withholding it from another. . . .  Surely, a 
woman’s right to choose preservation and protection of her health, and 
therefore, in many cases, her life, is at least as compelling as the state’s 
interest in promoting childbirth.  The restrictions in the [Medicaid] funding 
scheme thus not only endanger the health of women being treated in their 
program but prevent those women from choosing a medical procedure, 
abortion, when necessary to preserve their health. . . .  given the right of 
choice announced in Roe, once the state allows abortion funding if 
immediately necessary to save the mother’s life, the state’s interest in 
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These decisions often emphasize the medical nature of abortion that 
underlies the impermissible distinctions being drawn for poor women 
in Medicaid.39 
This is not to say that the medical nature of abortion should leave 
the decision to have an abortion in a doctor’s hands, or that health 
plan coverage of abortion should be limited to so-called “therapeutic” 
abortions.  Instead, the medical aspect of abortion highlights the 
disconnect between the proclaimed goal of providing “basic security” 
for healthcare and the reality of the ACA treating abortion as if it 
were not a form of healthcare. 
B. The Fragmenting Effect of Stakeholder-Oriented, Rights-
Absent Healthcare 
America’s medical system developed in a piecemeal fashion that 
was often more attuned to its stakeholders than to the medical needs 
of patients.  This patchwork has been described as “fragmented” or 
“disintegrated.”40  Physicians arguably have dominated the discourse 
by developing their medical profession into a guild that protected 
itself and its political interests, often at the expense of patients and 
the development of a coherent healthcare system.41  Every time 
politicians or other actors have pushed for developments such as 
universal health insurance, or advances in public health, or the 
alignment of stakeholder interests through vehicles such as integrated 
 
promoting childbirth cannot be considered sufficiently compelling to justify 
refusing to protect the health of a seriously ill woman. . . .  Thus, we 
conclude that the laws and regulations in question violate the provisions of 
article II, § 13 of the Arizona Constitution, which prohibit the enactment of 
any law granting any citizen privileges that shall not on the same terms 
“equally belong to all citizens.” 
Simat, 56 P.3d at 34. 
 39. See Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection 
for Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
469, 500–10 (2009) (discussing the themes of the state courts’ decisions regarding 
payment for poor women’s abortions). 
 40. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer Elhague 
ed., 2010) (collection of essays describing America’s “fragmented” healthcare system 
and prescribing changes to eliminate fragmentation, which the opening essay loosely 
defined as “unified decision making”).  Professor Elhague chose the term 
“fragmented” to describe the disunity of the American healthcare system because he 
sees integration and disintegration as descriptors, not necessarily fraught with 
negative connotation, where as “fragmentation” has normatively negative 
implications. See id. at 2 n.I. 
 41. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 2–29 
(1982) (introducing and summarizing the book’s premise that physicians have driven 
the format of American medicine socially and politically). 
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delivery systems, physicians have resisted, very successfully, by 
claiming that their autonomy would be jeopardized by any unitary 
reform to healthcare delivery.42  Hospitals have also defended their 
territory, as have other healthcare industry stakeholders who fear 
losing their piece of the pie.43 
One way to explain stakeholders’ success in fending off a 
philosophically, legally, or pragmatically cogent healthcare system is 
that no constitutional right to healthcare exists in the United States.44  
Some scholars have argued for such a right through, for example, a 
conception of property rights45 or through state constitutions,46 but the 
consensus is that no individual right to healthcare exists in the text or 
interstices of the United States Constitution.47  This is not to say that a 
right to healthcare could not be read into certain clauses or 
amendments to the Constitution, but no Supreme Court case has ever 
 
 42. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Healthcare Fragmentation, 
in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 12 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) 
(describing law as the source of healthcare fragmentation in the United States, laws 
that were “at least partly motivated by the interest group power of physicians”); see 
also STARR, supra note 41, at 235–89 (describing physicians’ role in preventing a 
uniform health insurance system in the United States and staving off other forms of 
interest alignment in the American healthcare delivery system).  It is hard to say in 
the case of the ACA whether physicians “won.”  The tradition of deference to 
physicians was overridden by political maneuvering, as the AMA opposed the law 
and it still passed; and, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
supported access to all kinds of healthcare for women, including abortion, but 
abortion has been excluded from the long list of women’s health services that must be 
covered by the ACA. 
 43. See STARR, supra note 41, at 295–310 (discussing hospitals’ resistance to 
health insurance and their lobbying efforts to prevent any form of management or 
control over their medical autonomy). 
 44. The exception to this rule is prisoners, for whom it is an Eighth Amendment 
violation (cruel and unusual punishment) to withhold medical care. See Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (“These elementary principles establish the 
government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration. . . .  We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ 
. . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 45. See, e.g., Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to 
Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 65 (2008) (arguing that “Americans have a property 
right to receive medical care”).  
 46. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the 
Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325 (2010) (recognizing the lack of a 
federal constitutional right to healthcare and cataloging the various state 
constitutional rights to medical care). 
 47. See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? 25 (2003) 
(“[N]owhere in the Constitution is there a hint of a right to health care.”). 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] WITH LIBERTY AND ACCESS FOR SOME 1367 
held that a collective or individual right to healthcare exists.48  Though 
in the modern era this absence might seem like a gross oversight, 
medicine leaned toward barbarism in the late 1700s, and a right to 
healthcare would have meant a right to bloodletting and other 
dubious practices.49 
In addition, at common law, physicians did not have a duty to treat 
anyone they did not wish to, unless an existing physician-patient 
relationship created an ongoing duty of care.50  One could argue that 
federal statutes such as Medicare,51 Medicaid,52 and the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act53 create statutory “rights” to 
healthcare, but these are not coherent rights that extend to all 
citizens.  Though these statutes fill some gaps, they do not cover 
enough ground to describe a general right to healthcare.  
Stakeholders arguably have had no drive to create a cogent medical 
 
 48. But see George J. Annas, A Poor Read on Rights, Rationing, and Racism, 32 
HEALTH AFF. 627 (2013), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
content/32/3/627.full.pdf+html.  Refuting the reviewed book’s assertions about 
healthcare rationing and rights, Professor Annas asserts a broad-based view of 
healthcare “rights”: 
The United States does, nonetheless, have all kinds of health care rights: 
constitutional rights; statutory rights, which are sometimes called 
entitlements; and common-law rights.  The only Americans who have a 
constitutional right to health care are prisoners under the Eighth 
Amendment. . . .  Women in the United States have a constitutional right to 
birth control and abortion, although not to have them financed.  Among the 
major statutory entitlements are Medicare; Medicaid; and medical services 
for veterans, active-duty military personnel, and Native Americans.  The 
most important common-law right to health care is the right to treatment in 
a hospital emergency department (at least until one’s condition is 
stabilized), assuming one can get to the emergency department and is 
assessed as having an emergency condition.  This right is also a federal 
statutory right because of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act of 1986.  These are all rights regarding access to health care.  
There are also a whole set of rights that individual patients have, sometimes 
referred to as “patients’ rights,” once they are under care, including 
informed consent, confidentiality, and privacy.  And, in this land of liberty, 
perhaps the strongest right in health care, and one that is also a 
constitutional right, is the right to refuse treatment. 
Id. 
 49. See STARR, supra note 41, at 155–57 (explaining the advent of hygienic 
hospital practices and antiseptic surgery followed by aseptic surgery shortly 
thereafter).  
 50. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (holding that doctors have 
no duty to treat unless an existing physician-patient relationship creates such an 
obligation). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
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system—neither common law nor constitutional law would have 
forced them to do so—and only recently have states attempted bold 
systemic reforms.54 
A constitutional right to medical care would not automatically lead 
to coherent healthcare delivery or aligned healthcare provider 
interests.55  Certain kinds of patients or procedures, however, can be 
separated more easily from the protection of the herd if patients have 
no recourse in the Constitution, statutes, or common law.  Arguably, 
the lack of a right to healthcare has smoothed the path to segregating 
one particular medical procedure from the attempt to create a 
plenary healthcare coverage scheme.  The strange irony of 
segregating abortion is that women do have a protected right to 
access abortion by virtue of Roe v. Wade,56 but that right has been 
limited over time.  Further, the right is theoretical if the care itself is 
inaccessible, which is especially true for poor women who do not have 
the resources to pay for private care.57 
Another aspect of the fragmented healthcare system that facilitates 
the separation of one procedure from the treatment of the whole 
person is the partition of the poor in public insurance (Medicaid) 
from forms of private insurance that historically have been subject to 
little government intervention.58  In the next Part, this Article will 
discuss the ramifications of abortion restrictions in both public and 
private insurance; here, the point is structural rather than substantive.  
Divided mechanisms of insurance further fragment healthcare and 
make it easier to chip away at certain patients’ coverage.  Medicaid 
enrollees in particular have been targeted for legislators’ morality 
 
 54. An obvious example is Massachusetts, which created universal insurance 
coverage in 2006 with “MassCare,” the model for the ACA. See 2006 Mass. Acts 58 
(session law creating universal insurance coverage). 
 55. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document created by the 
United Nations in the aftermath of World War II, contains an aspirational “right” to 
healthcare in Article 25, which provides: “Everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services . . . .” Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 
10, 1948).  The United States has never adopted this Declaration.  And even 
countries that have adopted it do not necessarily have cohesive healthcare access or 
delivery. 
 56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 57. All Medicaid enrollees are impoverished and thus unable to pay for private 
healthcare.  The purpose of the Medicaid Act is to help to mainstream our low-
income citizens into the healthcare system. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (describing 
categorical and financial eligibility for Medicaid enrollees). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to1396w-2. 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] WITH LIBERTY AND ACCESS FOR SOME 1369 
plays: one classic example was Representative Henry Hyde, who 
wanted to prevent all abortions.59  Representative Hyde knew he only 
had power over the poor women who relied on Medicaid for their 
access to healthcare services.60  Thus, he attached a rider on the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) annual budget 
that still prevents Medicaid payment for abortion except in extremely 
limited circumstances (such as rape, incest, and life endangerment).61  
Despite the protected right in Roe v. Wade, poor women could not 
stop Congress or the Court from defunding abortion.62 
Poor women have no protection from medical segregation.  They 
do not have a right to healthcare, they do not participate in a program 
that most voters contemplate or participate in, and they do not 
otherwise have political influence.63  The question that remains is how 
the abortion procedure, which is supposed to be protected by the 
fundamental right to privacy, can be excluded from the otherwise 
universal push for access to healthcare that the ACA embodies. 
C. Non-Woman-Centric Liberties 
The legal precedents undergirding the privacy right that protects 
access to abortion generally do not protect women as members of the 
polity or as patients.64  The failure to recognize the privacy and other 
 
 59. 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See infra notes 66–85 and accompanying text. 
 63. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (permitting third party 
standing for doctors who treat Medicaid patients because, among other reasons, 
Medicaid patients face insurmountable obstacles to getting into federal court, such as 
poverty). 
 64. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged this shaky foundation for women’s access to 
abortion in her scathing dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, the 2007 decision that upheld 
the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg documented the majority’s 
departure from Roe and Casey while at the same time noting the weakness of those 
precedents in failing to recognize control over reproductive health as a matter of 
equal protection.  She wrote:   
As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions 
is a woman’s “control over her [own] destiny.”  “There was a time, not so 
long ago,” when women were “regarded as the center of home and family 
life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and 
independent legal status under the Constitution.”  Those views, this Court 
made clear in Casey, “are no longer consistent with our understanding of 
the family, the individual, or the Constitution.”  Women, it is now 
acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right “to participate equally in 
the economic and social life of the Nation.”  Their ability to realize their full 
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rights that protect women’s health as being central to women’s rights 
has facilitated fragmentation in women’s healthcare.65  This is a 
structural theory regarding the segregation of abortion from the rest 
of women’s health, rather than a substantive argument about the 
underlying doctrine’s disconnect from women’s rights, and this 
framework has facilitated the greatest obstacle to women’s access to 
abortion since Harris v. McRae was decided. 
Harris v. McRae is the direct progenitor of the ACA’s abortion 
restrictions because it upheld the Hyde Amendment’s restriction on 
federal funding for abortion.66  The Court reasoned that Congress did 
not create the obstacle67 to abortion access because the women 
enrolled in Medicaid were impoverished by their own fault, rather 
than the fault of the government.68  The federal government, 
 
potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to “their ability to 
control their reproductive lives.”  Thus, legal challenges to undue 
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some 
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy 
to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.  
Id. at 171–72 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  In so reasoning, Justice Ginsburg 
cited some of the most important work on reproductive rights as matters of equality, 
which served to underscore her critique of the substantive due process basis for Roe 
and Casey’s privacy right. See id. at 172 (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the 
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984)). 
 65. See generally Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring 
Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013) (describing how 
Roe’s contextualization of abortion in the medical relationship was useful for 
perceiving abortion as part of healthcare and arguing that abortion must be 
positioned within a conception of women’s health that the Court has not recognized 
recently). 
 66. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 67. Id. at 315 (“The Hyde Amendment . . . places no governmental obstacle in the 
path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of 
unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative 
activity deemed in the public interest.”). 
 68. Id. at 316–17.  The key passage from Harris is as follows:  
But, regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due 
process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman’s 
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial 
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.  The reason 
why was explained in Maher: although government may not place obstacles 
in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not 
remove those not of its own creation.  Indigency falls in the latter category.  
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy 
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the 
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather 
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therefore, did not improperly restrict access to abortion by refusing to 
fund it, despite the unambiguous, targeted testimony that the Hyde 
Amendment was designed to prevent poor women from accessing 
abortion.69  The Court rejected an individual liberty argument, an 
equal protection argument, and a rationality argument that the Hyde 
Amendment infringed the rights of poor women and that the federal 
government was not asserting a legitimate interest in restricting access 
to abortion.70  It is possible that the Harris majority saw this funding 
restriction as a small carve-out or a minor funding issue.71  But if the 
Court had held that the Hyde Amendment was not a permissible 
restriction on abortion, the ACA would look very different.  This 
federal funding limitation for the small population of women enrolled 
in Medicaid in 1980 has become a channel by which, thirty years later, 
the ACA restricted funding for both private and public insurance 
coverage of abortion without fear of infringing women’s 
constitutional rights. 
Harris v. McRae sprang from more prominent liberty-protecting 
precedent—specifically, the line of Supreme Court decisions 
discovering individual fundamental rights that facilitated the Court’s 
holding in Roe v. Wade.72  None of this precedent, however, focused 
on women as the protected party per se.  For example, in 1942, the 
Court held that the right to procreate was fundamental to the human 
condition and was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the 
context for the decision was freedom from unwanted sterilization for 
 
of the woman’s indigency.  Although Congress has opted to subsidize 
medically necessary services generally, but not certain medically necessary 
abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent 
woman with at least the same range of choices in deciding whether to obtain 
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had 
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.  We are thus not persuaded 
that the Hyde Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected 
freedom of choice recognized in Wade. 
Id. 
 69. Representative Hyde stated during the floor debate of the so-called Hyde 
Amendment: “I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an 
abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman.  Unfortunately, the 
only vehicle available is the HEW medicaid [sic] bill.” 123 CONG. REC. 19,700 (1977) 
(statement of Rep. Hyde). 
 70. Harris, 448 U.S. at 324–26. 
 71. Elsewhere, I evaluated the struthious analysis in Harris as a function of the 
“negative versus positive rights” analysis of constitutional rights as well as a function 
of the “greater includes the lesser” theory of congressional power. Huberfeld, supra 
note 6, at 756–67. 
 72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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prisoners, not a positive right to procreate.73  In 1965, the Court held 
in Griswold v. Connecticut that married couples had a right to privacy 
in the marital bedroom that encompassed using contraceptives in that 
private space.74  This decision arguably resulted from a push by 
physicians to treat patients as they saw fit; thus, this holding focused 
on the physician-patient relationship rather than women as 
autonomous patients.75  In 1972, the Court held in Eisenstadt v. Baird 
that unmarried people had a right to be free from criminal 
prosecution for purchasing and using contraceptives.76  This decision 
hinged on the Equal Protection Clause and the determination that 
states could not legitimately distinguish between married and 
unmarried users of contraception.77  Again, the context was not 
reproductive justice for women.  Finally, after being argued in 1971, 
the Court issued a physician-centric decision in 1973 in Roe v. Wade, 
which held that a right to privacy encompassed the decision to end a 
pregnancy.78  Geduldig v. Aiello, decided in 1974, underscored these 
opinions when it infamously held that exclusion based on pregnancy 
is not sex-based discrimination.79 
Although these decisions protected women from governmental 
barriers in their healthcare lives, women qua women are absent from 
the Court’s analyses.  These foundational decisions did not articulate 
baseline protections for women as patients making autonomous 
decisions, or as members of the citizenry, or as equal political and 
economic participants in society.  Undoubtedly, Congress has 
detected leeway to impose substantial obstacles to women’s access to 
 
 73. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 75. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That 
Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2010) (explaining the physicians’ right 
to treat basis for some early abortion cases, including Griswold). 
 76. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 77. Id. at 453–54.  
 78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  As Linda Greenhouse noted, the Court mentioned the 
word “physician” more often than the word “woman” in the Roe opinion. Linda 
Greenhouse, Misconceptions, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/misconceptions/ (highlighting, on the 
fortieth anniversary of the decision, that women barely appeared in the language or 
reasoning of Roe v. Wade). 
 79. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that California did not impermissibly 
discriminate based on sex by excluding disability due to pregnancy from a state 
disability fund).  As Professor Law has noted, this concept is laughable, but it is very 
much of a piece with the Court’s inability to incorporate women’s rights into 
decisions that arguably protect women. Law, supra note 64, at 983 (chronicling 
critiques of Geduldig). 
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abortion.80  Historically, congressional flouting of the privacy right has 
existed primarily in Medicaid, though it has extended to other, 
smaller programs that enjoy federal funding through either outright 
prohibitions on funding abortions, such as for women in the military, 
or through conscience clause protections that protect healthcare 
providers participating in programs that receive federal funding.81  In 
2010, I dubbed these restrictions “pure funding statutes” and 
“conscience clause funding statutes.”82  The ACA promotes a much 
greater reach for abortion obstacles by amplifying both pure funding 
and conscience clause funding laws.83 
The concatenated nature of the fundamental rights protecting 
women’s access to abortion, in conjunction with the holding in Harris 
v. McRae, has facilitated a fracturing of women’s health needs.84  The 
ACA divides contraception from abortion in a manner made possible 
by a constitutional framework that lacks coherent vectors.  Both the 
right to use contraception and the right to access abortion hinge on a 
constitutional concept of privacy protection, yet the ACA seems to 
legitimize only one—contraception—which has been subject to less 
litigation but is rooted in the same jurisprudence.  If anything, the 
abortion right should be more clearly about women’s equal status in 
society given the feminist movement that had gained momentum 
through litigating state abortion bans by the time Roe was decided.85 
The Obama administration appears prepared to make President 
Clinton’s famous “safe, legal, and rare” remark about abortion into a 
 
 80. But see generally Siegel, supra note 75 (examining the feminist claims to 
abortion rights immediately predating the decision in Roe and explaining how the 
feminist movement influenced the Court’s 7-2 decision in Roe). 
 81. See Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 767–81 (discussing two kinds of federal 
spending statutes: those that refuse to cover abortion, and those that permit 
healthcare providers to recuse themselves from providing abortions, sterilizations, 
and other reproductive care services). 
 82. See id. at 767 (creating the terms described). 
 83. Pub. L. 111-148 §§ 1303, 10104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023) (prohibiting 
payment for abortions with federal funds, requiring segregated private payment for 
abortion coverage in health insurance plans in the Exchanges, and enhancing 
“provider conscience protections”). 
 84. Studies have shown that greater levels of unintended pregnancy are linked 
with higher incidence of abortion.  Thus, the argument that women’s access to 
abortion should be protected by the ACA is not an argument that necessarily leads to 
more abortion, just safer, earlier abortion in less stressful circumstances. See, e.g., 
Rachel Benson Gold, Insurance Coverage and Abortion Incidence: Information and 
Misinformation, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4 (2010). 
 85. See Siegel, supra note 75, at 1888–96 (tracing the strategies employed by 
women’s rights groups to change the focus from doctors’ rights to women’s rights). 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
1374 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
reality.  Pregnancy is a surprise to half of American women who learn 
they are pregnant, and almost forty percent of those surprise 
pregnancies end in abortion.86  Fewer surprise pregnancies by virtue 
of greater contraception access surely must mean that fewer women 
will seek abortion.87  But this hope does not protect those women who 
will still need to access safe, legal abortions for whatever reason, 
regardless of their income status.  A fragmented system and a 
fractured right have made way for the federal government to exclude 
one common form of healthcare from all others.  No matter how 
much access is gained through the ACA, poor women and women of 
color will suffer from this federal push to delegitimize abortion 
access.  Historically, the segregation of abortion has existed primarily 
in the world of public insurance, but as of 2014, women in both public 
and private insurance plans will be subject to restrictions on funding 
of abortion. 
II.  THE SPENDING AMPLIFICATION 
The ACA restricts abortion access by placing limitations on federal 
funding for any abortion except those resulting from life 
endangerment for the pregnant woman, rape, or incest.88  Such 
financial constraints are bound to affect poor women more 
dramatically than women of means because they will rely on either 
Medicaid or federal tax credits to obtain health insurance coverage, 
thereby inextricably linking poor women to limits on abortion.89  
Though at first glance it could appear that the application of the Hyde 
Amendment to all forms of insurance would not be much different 
from its longstanding application to Medicaid, the ACA undoubtedly 
aggrandizes the Hyde Amendment.  The following discussion 
demonstrates the greater limitations on abortion access initiated by 
the ACA for both public and private insurance, at both the federal 
and the state level. 
 
 86. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1 (Aug. 
2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf. 
 87. Gold, supra note 84, at 10. 
 88. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1303(a)(1)(B)(i) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18023(a)(1)(B)(i)) 
(incorporating by reference the Hyde Amendment, which contains the exception 
described). 
 89. See infra notes 98, 109 and accompanying text.  Medicaid will cover all adults 
under age 65 up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and those earning 100–400% of 
the federal poverty level will receive tax credits for purchasing private health 
insurance in Exchanges. Id. 
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A. A Quick Tour of the ACA 
Despite its ambitious goals, the ACA is not a radical law.  It builds 
on the existing medical system without shaping American healthcare 
into a more philosophically coherent, less fragmented system.90  The 
ACA’s crown jewel is arguably that it facilitates a health insurance 
home for all Americans.91  The ACA encourages all people legally 
residing in the United States to obtain health insurance coverage by 
requiring most people to pay a tax penalty for lack of coverage 
effective as of tax year 2014.92  The law allows various methods of 
compliance with the individual mandate through private health 
insurance (employer-based, small group, individual) or public health 
insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, veterans’ benefits, federal employee 
benefits) and permits limited exceptions for people with religious 
objections (such as Christian Scientists).93  An estimated thirty million 
new lives will be covered by virtue of the ACA’s insurance reform 
implementation.94 
In 2011, about fifty-five percent of Americans had access to health 
insurance through their employer.95  Those who do not have access to 
private health insurance through their employer will be eligible to 
purchase private health insurance through health benefit exchanges 
(“Exchanges”), which will act as clearinghouses for qualified health 
insurance plans to sell small group and individual insurance 
products.96  Exchanges can be run either by the state, by the federal 
 
 90. PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION 23 (2011) (describing how this round 
of healthcare reform negotiations resulted in building on the existing private/public 
insurance framework). 
 91. The first two titles of the ACA as a public law are focused on modifications to 
private insurance and public insurance to facilitate access to healthcare, which in the 
United States occurs by having health insurance. Pub. L. 111-148, Title I (Quality, 
Affordable Health Care for All Americans) & II (Role of Public Programs). 
 92. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).  
This requirement (the “individual mandate”) was upheld as a permissible exercise of 
Congress’s tax power on June 28, 2012, in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 93. Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)). 
 94. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20 
Estimates.pdf. 
 95. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 21 (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf. 
 96. Pub. L. 111-148 Title I, Part II (Consumer Choices and Insurance 
Competition through Health Benefit Exchanges); see also id. § 1312(f) (codified at 42 
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government, or by multi-state compacts.97  People whose income is 
100% to 400% of the federal poverty level will be eligible to receive a 
federal tax credit to cover the premium for purchasing private health 
insurance.98  Additionally, insurers that participate in Exchanges must 
meet a set of standards that render them “qualified” to offer plans 
through Exchanges; one of the more important requirements is 
coverage of “essential health benefits.”99 
The ACA defines “essential health benefits” to include at least the 
items and services that fall within ten specified categories of care: 
ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, 
maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse 
services, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services 
and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and 
chronic disease management, and pediatric services.100  The essential 
health benefits may only be subject to limited cost sharing.101  Insurers 
may cover more than the essential health benefits but not less.102  
Likewise, states that operate exchanges may require more essential 
health benefits to be covered than this list commands—it serves 
merely as a starting point.103 
The ACA contains many new federal rules for private health 
insurance, some of which apply to all private insurers, regardless of 
the market(s) in which they operate, and some of which apply only to 
those insurers that qualify to participate in exchanges.  One 
 
U.S.C. § 18032(f)) (explaining who is a “qualified individual” for purposes of 
purchasing insurance through Exchanges). 
 97. Pub. L. 111-148 §§ 1311, 1321 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041). 
 98. While the ACA states that people from 100–400% of the federal poverty level 
are eligible for tax credits, id. § 1401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 36B(c)), people from 
100% to 133% of the federal poverty level are eligible for Medicaid and will not be 
eligible to receive the tax credits so long as they are eligible for Medicaid. See 77 Fed. 
Reg. 30377 (2012).  In response to comments, HHS described that people from 100–
133% of the federal poverty level would typically be eligible for and enrolled in 
Medicaid thus not eligible for premium assistance through tax credits, but that some 
people will not be eligible for Medicaid and will therefore be able to receive premium 
assistance. See id. at 30378, 30387.  Thus, the implementing regulations specify that 
someone eligible for “Minimum Essential Coverage” through Medicaid would not 
qualify for the premium assistance, but that someone ineligible for Medicaid 
(perhaps due to state failure to expand Medicaid) would be eligible for premium 
assistance. See id. at 30387. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18022 (2012) (defining “qualified health plan” and 
“essential health benefits”). 
 100. Id. § 18022. 
 101. Id. § 18022(c). 
 102. Id. § 18022(b)(1). 
 103. Id. § 18031(d). 
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requirement that applies to group and individual insurance issuers, 
regardless of participation in exchanges, is coverage of “preventive 
health services” as defined by the Preventive Service Task Force.104  
This provision falls within the ACA’s Title I requirements that are 
designed to “improv[e] coverage” and describes that “[all] group 
health plan[s] and . . . health insurance insurer[s] offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall . . . provide coverage for 
and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements . . . with respect to 
women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . . provided 
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the [HRSA].”105  This 
rule fits with the prohibition against rating insurance higher for 
women (so-called “gender rating”) and with the requirement that 
maternity care be covered by plans in Exchanges.  All of these new 
provisions will “improve coverage.”106 
The IOM has followed the ACA’s order to consider the health 
needs of women by instructing that certain elements of care for 
women should be covered without the copayment typically required 
by insurers.107  That list includes prenatal care and testing, testing for 
sexually transmitted infections, all Food and Drug Administration 
approved forms of contraception and sterilization, domestic violence 
screening and treatment, and “at least one well-woman visit” per 
year.108  The IOM recommendation, though otherwise comprehensive, 
does not and cannot include abortion. 
The ACA also expands Medicaid, the program that has provided a 
public healthcare safety net for the poor since 1965, to everyone up to 
 
 104. Id. § 300gg-13. 
 105. Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES 
FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 109–16 (2011), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13181 (“[r]ecommending for 
consideration as a preventing service for women: the full range of Food and Drug 
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity”); Clinical 
Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 2011), 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-Preventive-
Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf (describing the health 
benefits the ACA directs toward women, which include limiting co-payments). 
 108. Clinical Preventive Services for Women, INST. OF MED. 1 (July 2011), 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-Preventive-
Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf. 
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133% of the federal poverty level.109  Medicaid is a federal-state 
partnership that contains mandatory elements by which states must 
abide if they want to receive federal funding.110  Medicaid has long 
mandated coverage of pregnant women, women with young children, 
and disabled women, but it has never required coverage of non-
disabled, non-elderly childless adults.111  The ACA eradicates 
longstanding limitations on Medicaid that extended the program to 
only the “deserving poor” because Medicaid will cover all adults 
under age sixty-five, regardless of reproductive or parental status, by 
January 1, 2014.112 
B. Public Insurance 
Medicaid covers approximately forty percent of all births in the 
United States.113  Historically, medical welfare programs, including 
programs that predated Medicaid, have covered pregnant women.114  
This set of women has benefited from the access to healthcare that 
Medicaid facilitates, and, in fact, pregnant women in particular have 
benefited from more generous coverage than other women,115 but 
they also have suffered from the limitations that the Hyde 
Amendment imposes.  Medicaid will now cover another group of 
women, childless women under the age of sixty-five, who will gain 
access to essential health benefits just like women in the private 
insurance exchanges.116  Like pregnant women and mothers, this new 
 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 439–46 (2011) (explaining the entrenched categories of 
eligibility in the Medicaid program and predecessor programs). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 113. Issue Brief: 2010 Maternal and Child Health Update: States Make Progress 
Towards Improving Systems of Care, NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES 12 (Jan. 19, 
2011), http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/MCHUPDATE2010.PDF.  
The percentage of births covered by Medicaid in each state varies quite widely. See 
id. at 13. 
 114. Huberfeld, supra note 111, at 438–49 (explaining the historical roots of 
Medicaid’s selective coverage). 
 115. States have the option to expand Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women up 
to 185% of the federal poverty level, and many of them do so. See Income Eligibility 
Limits for Pregnant Women as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL), January 
2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-
indicator/income-eligibility-fpl-pregnant-women/.  As this chart shows, the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program allows states to cover pregnant women above 185% of the 
federal poverty level. See id. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(k). 
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group of women will be subject to the Hyde Amendment.117  The 
current prediction is that the Medicaid expansion will cover 
approximately 4.6 million new women of reproductive age, all of 
whom will be subject to this restriction.118 
Uninsured women newly enrolled in Medicaid will experience a net 
gain in healthcare access, as the ACA creates a new Medicaid 
insurance coverage.119  Medicaid has required coverage of pregnant 
women, mothers, elderly women, and permanently disabled women, 
but not other adult women.120  This limitation and others like it have 
facilitated a program that covers children but not their parents, as 
parents historically only have been eligible for Medicaid at very low 
levels of income.121  Thus, Medicaid has experienced coverage gaps 
that affect families, despite well-understood risks for disease spread 
among family members,122 and despite understanding that a woman’s 
health long before pregnancy can impact the course of a pregnancy.123  
Women have been treated as deserving of Medicaid’s assistance to 
ensure healthy pregnancies and to reduce infant mortality; the 
Medicaid expansion helps to eradicate this limited approach to 
women’s health. 
On the other hand, in spite of this net gain of access to care, these 
newly covered Medicaid enrollees nevertheless will not have access to 
one of the most common procedures for women in the United States.  
Restrictions on federal funding for abortion procedures are almost as 
 
 117. Id. § 18023(b)(1)(B)(i) (referring to the restriction on funding for the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which is the Hyde Amendment). 
 118. Genevieve M. Kenney et al., Opting in to the Medicaid Expansion under the 
ACA: Who Are the Uninsured Adults Who Could Gain Health Insurance 
Coverage?, URB. INST. (Aug. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412630-
opting-in-medicaid.pdf. 
 119. Erin Armstrong, 10 Reasons the Medicaid Expansion Is Good for Women, 
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.healthlaw.org/ 
images/stories/2012_08_13_Reasons_Medicaid_Good_Women.pdf. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).  States have also had the option of covering 
women and men with breast cancer, women with cervical cancer, and uninsured 
women’s family planning services. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII). 
 121. See Quick Take: Who Benefits from the ACA Medicaid Expansion?, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (June 14, 2012), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/quicktake_aca_ 
medicaid.cfm. 
 122. See, e.g., Karla L. Hanson, Is Insurance for Children Enough? The Link 
Between Parents’ and Children’s Use of Health Care Revisited, 35 INQUIRY 294 
(1998). 
 123. In the global health context, this is sometimes called the “life-course” 
perspective on women’s health. See, e.g., Phyllis Moen et al., Successful Aging: A 
Life-Course Perspective on Women’s Multiple Roles and Health, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1612 
(1992). 
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old as Roe v. Wade.124  As discussed supra, the Hyde Amendment has 
attached as an annual rider to HHS funding since 1977, and it limits 
Medicaid to paying for abortions when the life of the mother is in 
danger (and sometimes in instances of incest, rape, and jeopardized 
health, though the breadth of the restriction varies from year to 
year).125 
Thus, low-income women have had a three-front war in 
reproductive health: they have had less money to pay for 
contraceptives (despite federal funding for family planning through 
Medicaid and Title X) and therefore were more likely to have 
unintended pregnancies;126 they are less likely to be able to obtain an 
abortion without significant sacrifice because Medicaid almost never 
pays for the procedure;127 and few doctors participate in Medicaid, 
reducing poor women’s ability to find physicians to provide their 
healthcare.128  The ACA helps to address the first problem by 
requiring insurers to provide contraceptive coverage for all women.  
Arguably, poor women will now have better control over their 
reproductive lives, and even states with waivers seemingly will not be 
able to require copayments for prescription contraception, as 
essential health benefits apply to Medicaid’s expansion population as 
well as private health plans in Exchanges.129  The health benefits of 
contraception are incontrovertible, and they include not only 
prevention of unexpected pregnancy but also such benefits as 
pregnancy spacing and further “side” benefits of better economic 
status and better educational attainment that attend being able to 
control reproductive capacity.130  The ACA helps to rectify the 
 
 124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 125. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 126. In Brief: Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Aug. 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html; see also 
Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Determinants of and Disparities in Reproductive Health 
Service Use Among Adolescent and Young Adult Women in the United States, 
2002–2008, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2 (2012). 
 127. See Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 741–42 (describing how funding and other 
restrictions on abortion “impact low-income women the hardest”). 
 128. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, 
Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 191 (1995) (explaining how 
physician refusal to participate in Medicaid perpetuates a two-tier healthcare system 
for people with money and people without). 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5) (2012). 
 130. Comm. on Healthcare for Underserved Women, Benefits to Women of 
Medicaid Expansion Through the Affordable Care Act, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (Jan. 2013), http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/ 
Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/Benef
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contraception inaccessibility problem as well as general medical 
access problems for poor women.131  The Medicaid expansion will 
enable poor women, regardless of their reproductive status, to access 
consistent healthcare. 
The second front in poor women’s reproductive health is greatly 
complicated by the ACA’s amplifications of limitations on federal 
funding of abortions in most circumstances.132  More to the point in 
the context of public insurance, the ACA not only continues but also 
expands the strictures on Medicaid enrollees who need to access 
abortion by applying the Hyde Amendment to the expansion 
population.133  These restrictions mean that any woman on Medicaid 
who needs an abortion will have to pay out of pocket.  Women 
enrolled in Medicaid by definition are impoverished and cannot 
afford the expense without sacrificing other basic necessities, such as 
food, shelter, and clothing.134  The Medicaid expansion exacerbates 
this aspect of women’s reproductive health struggles.135 
 
its_to_Women_of_Medicaid_Expansion-Affordable_Care_Act; see also Comm. on 
Healthcare for Underserved Women, The Uninsured, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (Sept. 2008), http://www.acog.org/Resources_And_Publications/ 
Committee_Opinions/Committee_on_Health_Care_for_Underserved_Women/The_
Uninsured. 
 131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). 
 132. The federal government’s position on funding abortion is somewhat 
mysterious given that a strong majority of the population believes that Roe v. Wade 
should not be overturned, as was evidenced by polls on the recent fortieth 
anniversary of the decision. See Roe v. Wade at 40: Most Oppose Overturning 
Abortion Decision, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/roe-v-
wade-at-40.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2013).  The report summarizes: 
As the 40th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision 
approaches, the public remains opposed to completely overturning the 
historic ruling on abortion.  More than six-in-ten (63%) say they would not 
like to see the court completely overturn the Roe v. Wade decision, which 
established a woman’s constitutional right to abortion at least in the first 
three months of pregnancy.  Only about three-in-ten (29%) would like to 
see the ruling overturned.  These opinions are little changed from surveys 
conducted 10 and 20 years ago. 
Id. 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)(B)(i) (referring to the restriction on funding for the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which is the Hyde Amendment). 
 134. Heather Boonstra & Adam Sonfield, Rights Without Access: Revisiting 
Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 
(Apr. 2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030208.pdf. 
 135. See Janet Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, The “Other” Within: Health Care 
Reform, Class, and the Politics of Reproduction, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 379–
81(2012) (highlighting how limits on reproductive care disproportionately impact 
poor women). 
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The third front is only minimally helped by the ACA.  Some 
commentators are concerned that the ACA does not do enough to 
facilitate entry of primary care physicians into the healthcare system 
in time to accommodate all of the new patients who will be covered 
by health insurance and seeking care.136  More specifically in the 
Medicaid context, the ACA increased the rates of Medicaid providers 
to the same payment levels as Medicare primary care providers for 
the years 2013 and 2014.137  The idea was to encourage more 
physicians to become Medicaid participating providers by the lure of 
the higher reimbursement so that they would be in the system and 
ready to accept the expansion population in 2014.138  Unfortunately, 
the increase does not extend beyond 2014,139 which makes it unlikely 
that the primary care physician shortage will be permanently solved, 
especially for Medicaid patients. 
This three-front war on low-income women has been limited, for 
the most part, to Medicaid enrollees.  But the ACA will introduce 
these access problems to limited-income women who rely on federal 
subsidies to obtain private health insurance.  The next section 
describes how the ACA greatly increases the scale of limitations on 
access to abortion through private insurance. 
C. Private Insurance 
Before the ACA was enacted, state law restrictions on private 
insurance coverage of abortion were not common, and most people 
with employer-sponsored insurance had coverage for the 
procedure.140  Nevertheless, a cluster of private insurance restrictions 
have existed at the state level.  Most notably, a handful of states 
prevented private health insurers from providing abortion coverage 
through their general policies, meaning plan enrollees had to pay for 
 
 136. See Marshall B. Kapp, Conscripted Physician Services and the Public’s 
Health, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 414 (2012); Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next 
Challenge—Securing Primary Care for Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 364, 493–95 (2011). 
 137. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, § 
1202, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)). 
 138. See Rene Bowser, The Affordable Care Act and Beyond: Opportunities for 
Advancing Health Equity and Social Justice, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 69, 
83–84 (2012). 
 139. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, § 
1202, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)). 
 140. Memo on Private Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 
19, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/01/19/index.html. 
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a separate abortion rider.141  In addition, some states have refused to 
allow abortion coverage for state employees.142  Federal law has also 
limited privately insured women’s access to abortions through public 
insurance coverage restrictions and by allowing healthcare providers 
to opt out of performing abortion and sterilization procedures for 
reasons of conscience.143 
The ACA dramatically changes the visibility of the issue of private 
insurance for abortion coverage at both the federal and the state 
levels.144  Even though the ACA requires all health insurers to cover 
preventive health care for women, and even though maternity care is 
specifically listed as an essential health benefit for insurers to cover in 
the Exchanges, the ACA directly and indirectly limits private 
insurance coverage for abortion.  The law pushes private insurance 
restrictions much farther than they reached in most states before its 
passage by omitting abortion from the definition of essential health 
benefits145 and by requiring riders on all of the policies obtained 
through the Exchanges regardless of whether they are established by 
the federal government or the states.146  This will force insurers to 
limit their packages of covered benefits because insurers will not want 
to have separate plans for Exchange-based and non-Exchange-based 
clientele.147 
The ACA specifically excludes abortion from essential health 
benefits, both as such benefits are defined and as a gatekeeping 
requirement for Exchange participation.148  The original exclusion was 
 
 141. See infra notes 155–65 and accompanying text. 
 142. Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last updated July 1, 
2013) (reporting that eighteen states prohibit insurance coverage of abortion for state 
employees and providing a chart of all fifty states’ insurance policy limitations). 
 143. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (the “Church amendment”); 42 U.S.C. § 238n 
(the “Danforth Amendment”); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-161, § 508(d)(1), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209 (2007) (the “Weldon Amendment”). 
 144. See, e.g., Magda Schaler-Hayes et al., Abortion Coverage and Health Reform: 
Restrictions and Options for Exchange-Based Insurance Markets, 15 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 323 (2012). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining essential health benefits, which does not include 
abortion). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 18023 (special rules for abortion coverage in exchanges). 
 147. Thus far, only one state—Washington—is seriously debating requiring 
qualified health plans in Exchanges to cover abortion services. See Jonathan 
Kaminsky, Washington State May Mandate Abortion Insurance, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 
24, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/23/wash-state-weighs-
first-abortion-insurance-mandate/7wfHQTMiYiJgWNY4nDZzBL/story.html. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 18023. 
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written permissively, indicating that Title I of the ACA did not 
require qualified health plans to provide abortion coverage.149  But 
the original language was replaced by Title X of the ACA, which 
amended the language of Title I significantly.150  Title X provided in 
pertinent part, “A State may elect to prohibit abortion coverage in 
qualified health plans offered through an Exchange in such State if 
such State enacts a law to provide for such prohibition.”151  In other 
words, the ACA invited states to pass laws prohibiting coverage of 
abortions in Exchanges.  The section also permits private insurers to 
choose whether to cover abortions while clarifying that essential 
health benefits do not include abortions (and therefore insurers need 
not cover abortion to participate in Exchanges).152  This section 
further restricts payment for abortions by forbidding use of federal 
tax credits in Exchanges to pay for abortions, except in circumstances 
permitted by the Hyde Amendment.153  Otherwise, the qualifying 
health plans are responsible for segregating federal funds from 
personal funds, as only personal funds may be used for covering 
abortions (except in the instances of rape, incest, and life 
endangerment).154 
A number of states have forbidden qualifying insurers from 
covering abortion, whether or not the state has chosen to construct its 
own Exchange.155  This trend reveals that the federal government has 
encouraged the states to become bolder in their restrictions on 
covering abortion through private insurance.  Until 2010, only five 
states had enacted laws forbidding private insurers from covering 
abortion through general policy provisions: North Dakota,156 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 151. See id.  The state may also repeal such a law. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (defining a qualified health plan for Exchange purposes). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b). 
 154. Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15599 (Mar. 24, 2010), reprinted as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 18023 app.  
 155. State Policies in Brief: Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, 
GUTTMACHER, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last 
updated July 1, 2013). 
 156. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-03 (2011) (“No health insurance contracts, plans, 
or policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state may provide coverage for 
abortions, including the elimination of one or more unborn children in a multifetal 
pregnancy, except by an optional rider for which there must be paid an additional 
premium.  Provided, however, that this section does not apply to the performance of 
an abortion necessary to prevent the death of the woman.”). 
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Missouri,157 Idaho,158 Kentucky,159 and Oklahoma.160  These laws 
prohibited private insurance companies from providing health 
insurance coverage for abortions unless the consumer purchased a 
separate rider for abortion coverage.  These laws appear to have had 
 
 157. MO. REV. STAT. § 376.805 (2013).  Missouri was the first of these five states to 
incorporate a ban against paying for abortions through Exchanges.  Thus, the 
amended language of the law reads:  
1.  No health insurance contracts, plans, or policies delivered or issued for 
delivery in the state shall provide coverage for elective abortions except by 
an optional rider for which there must be paid an additional premium.  For 
purposes of this section, an “elective abortion” means an abortion for any 
reason other than a spontaneous abortion or to prevent the death of the 
female upon whom the abortion is performed. 
2.  Subsection 1 of this section shall be applicable to all contracts, plans or 
policies of: 
     (1) All health insurers subject to this chapter; and 
     (2) All nonprofit hospital, medical, surgical, dental, and health service 
corporations . . . ; and 
     (3) All health maintenance organizations. 
3.  No health insurance exchange established within this state or any health 
insurance exchange administered by the federal government or its agencies 
within this state shall offer health insurance contracts, plans, or policies that 
provide coverage for elective abortions, nor shall any health insurance 
exchange operating within this state offer coverage for elective abortions 
through the purchase of an optional rider . . . . 
Id.  Notably, Missouri was not the first state to prohibit payment for abortions 
through Exchanges. See, e.g., Julian Pecquet, Missouri Fifth State to Opt Out of 
Abortion Coverage in State Insurance Exchange, HILL HEALTHWATCH (July 14, 
2010, 5:53 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-
implementation/108849-missouri-fifth-state-to-opt-out-of-abortion-coverage-in-state-
insurance-exchange. 
 158. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2142 (2013) (“All policies, contracts, plans or 
certificates of disability insurance delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in this 
state after the effective date of this section shall exclude coverage for elective 
abortions.  Such exclusion may be waived by endorsement and the payment of a 
premium therefor.  Availability of such coverage shall be at the option of the 
insurance carrier.”).  Idaho passed a new law prohibiting abortion coverage in 
exchanges on April 1, 2011. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §41-1848 (2013).   
 159. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.5-160 (West 2012) (“No health insurance contracts, 
plans or policies delivered or issued for delivery in the state shall provide coverage 
for elective abortions except by an optional rider for which there must be paid an 
additional premium.  For purposes of this section, an ‘elective abortion’ means an 
abortion for any reason other than to preserve the life of the female upon whom the 
abortion is performed.”). 
 160. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.2 (2011) (“No health insurance contracts, plans, or 
policies delivered or issued for delivery in this state shall provide coverage for 
elective abortions except by an optional rider for which there shall be paid an 
additional premium.”), repealed by 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 92. 
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a deterrent effect, at least to a degree.161  For example, the vice 
president of Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Dakota, which 
covers approximately eighty percent of North Dakotans, stated that 
no member has purchased the insurance rider.162  In Missouri and 
Kentucky, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield representatives claimed 
that very few citizens are aware of the option to purchase the rider.163  
In Idaho, Anthem does not advertise the abortion rider option, and 
patients must specifically request it.164  The economics of paying for a 
rider are questionable; a woman and her family would be better off 
saving for the proverbial rainy day than paying for an actuarially 
unfavorable rider.  But even if a woman wanted to carry an abortion-
specific rider, it appears that private insurers do not offer them in any 
meaningful manner.165 
The ACA gave state legislation such as this the imprimatur of the 
federal government.166  As a result, many more state legislatures have 
both proposed and passed separate insurance rider bills across the 
country.  Prior to the enactment of the ACA in 2010, only the five 
states discussed above had passed laws that prohibited private 
insurance coverage for abortion.167  But Congress ensured that states 
have the option to refuse to permit insurance coverage for abortions 
in the newly established Exchanges when it passed the amending, 
companion legislation to the ACA.168  Consequently, some of the 
states that had abortion coverage limitations prior to the ACA have 
expanded the prohibition on insurance coverage to the Exchanges.169  
 
 161. See Peter Slevin, Insurers Report on Use of Abortion Riders, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/ 
AR2010031302139_pf.html. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See Schaler-Hayes et al., supra note 144, at 362–63. 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1) (2012). 
 167. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Schaler-Haynes et al., supra note 144, at 339–44 (detailing the legislative 
history of the insurance coverage restrictions in the ACA); see also David 
Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Obama Rallies Democrats in Final Push for Health 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/ 
health/policy/21health.html (describing the prominent role of abortion coverage in 
the last push to pass the ACA). 
 169. Idaho, Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma have introduced or passed 
legislation restricting coverage of abortion in state exchanges. See Health Reform 
and Abortion Coverage in the Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-reform-and-abortion-
coverage.aspx (listing state laws that restrict insurance coverage of abortion in state 
exchanges). 
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More notably, other states that previously had no such regulations 
have proposed bills or enacted laws to that effect.170  As of February 1, 
2013, twenty states had enacted laws prohibiting qualified plans in 
Exchanges from covering abortion.171 
The federal government has signaled that it does not take the 
privacy right that protects women’s access to abortions seriously, and 
the states are following this example.  The ACA has created a federal 
structure that allows state lawmakers who desired private insurance 
abortion coverage prohibitions to pursue this legislative option more 
aggressively.  Unsurprisingly, states that are prohibiting abortion 
coverage in Exchanges are also prohibiting other kinds of abortion 
access.  Congress has sent a message that it is not going to protect 
women within the reach of federal funding. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court decided National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), a high-profile and 
controversial decision that upheld the ACA’s requirement for 
minimum insurance coverage (the “individual mandate”) as a 
permissible exercise of Congress’s power to tax while also holding 
that the expansion of Medicaid impermissibly coerced the states into 
accepting conditions on federal spending.172  This opinion held for the 
first time that Congress’s spending power could be limited by judicial 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment.173  The opening statement of 
 
 170. See id. (listing Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin as the states that have enacted legislation 
preventing insurance coverage of abortion); see also State Policies in Brief: 
Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf (last updated July 1, 
2013). 
 171. State Policies in Brief: Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, 
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf 
(last updated July 1, 2013). 
 172. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).  In the 
context of the NFIB opinion, the Court appeared to be concerned with protecting an 
individual liberty that can only be described as a right not to purchase health 
insurance.  Because the Court was concerned with this unrecognized, arguably non-
cognizable liberty interest, Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent found that the 
commerce power does not sufficiently support the enactment of the individual 
mandate. Id. at 2590. 
 173. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For a 
thorough deconstruction of the Medicaid aspect of the decision, see generally Nicole 
Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion makes it clear that Court-enforced 
federalism will be central to the decision, describing federalism as a 
doctrine that protects the states in the name of individual liberty.174 
In the context of the Medicaid expansion, the Court relied on a 
more straightforward concept of federalism to police the line between 
federal and state power.  A plurality of the justices found the 
Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally coercive because states 
have no real choice but to participate in the proposed expansion.175  
The Court held the expansion coercive because the states could not 
have anticipated the expansion of Medicaid to all impoverished 
citizens when they joined the limited program in 1965; because the 
plurality viewed the expansion as a “shift in kind, not degree;” and 
because the states could lose all of their Medicaid funding if they 
failed to expand their programs to all adults under age sixty-five, 
resulting in a deficit too great for the states to make up on their 
own.176  The remedy for the ACA’s unconstitutional coercion was to 
sever the Secretary of HHS’s authority to withhold all Medicaid 
funding from states that refuse to expand their Medicaid programs.177  
Thus, no part of the ACA or the Medicaid Act was struck down, but a 
mandatory element of the Medicaid program was rendered optional 
for the states.178  In other words, states may opt out of the Medicaid 
expansion, and the only federal funding they jeopardize is the funding 
for the expansion population.  They will be able to continue to 
participate in the Medicaid program without losing their existing 
funding.  As I have written elsewhere, the Medicaid analysis suffers 
from a number of factual and jurisprudential faults.179 
 
 174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (citing New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive 
from the diffusion of sovereign power.”)).  The opinion emphasizes that federalism 
protects individuals, much like Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bond v. United States 
and prior opinions that elevated federalism principles. Bond v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2355 (2011) (holding that a criminal defendant may challenge the constitutionality 
of the federal statute under which she was convicted by raising Tenth Amendment 
concerns with the law). 
 175. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603, 2608. 
 176. Id. at 2601–07. 
 177. Id. at 2607 (ruling that only expansion funding can be withheld if a state opts 
out of the Medicaid expansion). 
 178. Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the Court did not rule any 
provision of the ACA unconstitutional). 
 179. See Huberfeld et al., supra note 173, at 46–76; see also Nicole Huberfeld, 
Heed Not the Umpire (Justice Ginsburg Called NFIB), 15 U. PA. J. CONSTL. L. 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 43 (2013), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1657-
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NFIB produced at least three ramifications for women’s healthcare 
access.  First, NFIB jeopardizes the access to care that our poorest 
citizens would receive if states exercise the option to decline the 
Medicaid expansion.  The Roberts plurality allowed states to opt out 
of the Medicaid expansion, which will directly impact women who 
would have enrolled in Medicaid in those states.180  A number of 
states appear poised to reject the Medicaid expansion and the money 
it promises, even though studies consistently indicate that this appears 
to be against their economic self-interest.  Thus, some women 
residing in states that exercise the “Red State Option”181 will have no 
insurance access either through Medicaid or the exchanges, because 
the ACA only provides federal subsidies to people from 100% to 
400% of the federal poverty level.  One recent study estimated that as 
many as four million women may be excluded from health insurance 
coverage due to states opting out of the Medicaid expansion.182  Many 
of the women who should be covered by the Medicaid expansion 
would be too poor to access private insurance through Exchanges, so 
even though they would not be subject to the tax penalty for failure to 
be covered by health insurance, they would not gain access to health 
insurance, either. 
Though on the surface these women appear to face stagnation, data 
indicates that they are more likely to experience unintended 
pregnancies and more likely to seek abortion to end the 
pregnancies.183  Thus, states that opt out of Medicaid expansion may 
see more poor women who cannot afford consistent contraception 
 
huberfeld15upajconstlheightscrutiny432013pdf (highlighting the factual faults of the 
Roberts opinion). 
 180. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (restricting the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to withholding funding for the Medicaid 
expansion if states choose not to participate in the expansion); see also Huberfeld et 
al., supra note 173, at 6 (calling the Court’s remedy to allow states to reject the 
Medicaid expansion while keeping their existing Medicaid programs and funding the 
“Red State Option”). 
 181. Huberfeld et al., supra note 173, at 6. 
 182. Lindsay Rosenthal, Interactive Map: Rejecting Medicaid Expansion Could 
Leave 4 Million Women Without Coverage, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 27, 
2013), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2013/02/27/54864/interactive-
map-rejecting-medicaid-expansion-could-leave-4-million-women-without-coverage/. 
 183. See Rachel K. Jones & Megan L. Kavenaugh, Changes in Abortion Rates 
Between 2000 and 2008 and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion, 117 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 1358 (2011) (describing that abortion rates have dropped overall but 
have increased among poor women and women of color); see also Ikemoto, supra 
note 9, at 749–52. 
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seeking abortions and sacrificing life needs to obtain them.  Notably, 
the states poised to opt out of the Medicaid expansion are also states 
that attempt to limit abortion access the most and that tend to have 
the most uninsured women and the highest federal Medicaid match.184  
They also tend to have the fewest female legislators.185 
Thus, adults who were not covered by their states’ Medicaid 
programs prior to the ACA’s enactment will not be saved by the 
private insurance subsidies offered to the remaining population, 
because some of them will be too poor to qualify for the tax subsidies 
that make private insurance affordable in the Exchanges.  Although 
such women will also be too poor to be penalized for failing to carry 
health insurance, the greater problem is that they will have no health 
insurance coverage.  These poor women will not gain any of the 
access to care facilitated by the ACA, and they may become more 
likely to seek abortions as a result. 
Second, NFIB protects states that reject coverage of abortion in 
private insurance, but it also protects states that facilitate insurance 
coverage of abortion.  The Roberts opinion carefully stated that its 
holding regarding the Medicaid expansion was limited to the 
expansion and did not implicate other aspects of the ACA.186  
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that state sovereignty will be 
protected from federal encroachments by exercises of conditional 
spending power.187  In the context of abortion under the ACA, this 
seems to indicate that states may choose to either limit access to 
abortion or facilitate it, and movement in either direction likely 
would be protected state exercises of sovereignty pursuant to NFIB. 
 
 184. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is Texas, which has the 
highest number of uninsured individuals of any state, refuses to create an Exchange, 
is loudly protesting the Medicaid expansion, but which also has a very high federal 
match for its Medicaid program. See Melissa del Bosque, Rick Perry’s Refusal to 
Expand Texas’ Medicaid Program Could Result in Thousands of Deaths, TEX. 
OBSERVER (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.texasobserver.org/rick-perrys-refusal-to-
expand-texas-medicaid-program-could-result-in-thousands-of-deaths; Shan Li, 
Protesters March to Urge Texas Gov. Rick Perry to Expand Medicaid, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-medicaid-texas-perry-
20130306,0,368024.story. 
 185. Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Eagleton Inst. of Politics, Fact Sheet: Women 
in State Legislatures 2013, RUTGERS U. (Apr. 2013), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/ 
fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/stleg.pdf.  The states with the fewest female 
legislators, according to this study, are Louisiana, South Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Alabama, Utah, West Virginia, Mississippi, Wyoming, Arkansas, and North Dakota.   
 186. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608–09 (2012).  
 187. Id. at 2601–08. 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
2013] WITH LIBERTY AND ACCESS FOR SOME 1391 
The ACA allows states to exclude abortion coverage from private 
insurance in exchanges.188  But, it also allows states to continue 
covering abortion services if they so choose.  Though the ACA acts as 
a beacon to state legislatures desiring limits on abortion, it also leaves 
the states that have covered abortion in Medicaid, or that otherwise 
would allow abortion coverage in Exchanges, to proceed in that 
manner as well.  Though the number of states that have added private 
insurance restrictions on abortion coverage is startling, it is important 
to remember that three-fifths of states have not passed such 
legislation, and NFIB protects their decision equally. 
Third, NFIB opens the door to further litigation regarding the 
rights of both states and individuals in the Medicaid program, because 
the coercion doctrine is up for grabs.189  One recent example of a state 
getting creative with NFIB’s coercion holding can be found in a 
Seventh Circuit decision regarding Indiana’s funding of Planned 
Parenthood.190  Indiana passed a law that prevented all government 
funding, federal or state, from flowing to entities that provided any 
abortion services.191  Planned Parenthood and other plaintiffs, 
supported by the United States, challenged the law as violating 
Medicaid’s “free choice of provider” requirement, which makes it so 
that Medicaid enrollees can receive services from any provider willing 
to accept Medicaid as reimbursement for services.192  Citing NFIB, 
Indiana attempted to assert that it was at risk of losing all of its 
Medicaid funding for noncompliance with a term of the Medicaid 
Act, but that the provisions of the Act were not federal law with 
which the state needed to comply because compliance was voluntary 
on the state’s part.193  The Seventh Circuit rejected this coercion 
argument, finding that it would be absurd to require the federal 
government to comply with the terms of the Medicaid Act but not the 
state that voluntarily participates in the Medicaid program.194 
 
 188. See supra notes 140–65 and accompanying text. 
 189. Both Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent refused to articulate a rule 
for coercion, leaving its contours to lower court exploration. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus., 
132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 190. See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of 
Health, 699 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3557 (May 28, 
2013) (No. 12-1159). 
 191. Id. at 968. 
 192. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)). 
 193. Id. at 976–77. 
 194. Id.  The state’s coercion argument was tied to its assertion that the free choice 
of provider provision does not give rise to private rights of action under §1983. Id.  
The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument as well. Id. 
HUBERFELD_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:40 PM 
1392 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
Indiana’s loss on the coercion theory does not mean more states 
will not try similar tactics.  Maine has attempted a coercion argument 
with regard to the ACA’s maintenance of effort provision,195 and 
Massachusetts claimed that the Defense of Marriage Act coerced the 
state into accepting a more limited version of marriage than its 
citizens desired.196  Other states are sure to follow suit, in the context 
of the Medicaid expansion or even the Exchanges, and the 
exploration of coercion may lead to a further narrowing of access to 
women’s medical care. 
CONCLUSION 
The ACA reflects a long-standing disconnect in the law by denying 
to women the “basic security” of providing insurance for a procedure 
that one in three women will need during their reproductive lifetime.  
On one hand, the access-enhancing elements of the ACA are likely to 
help women, who statistically earn lower wages, need more medical 
care, and live longer than men, to gain access to preventive and 
regular healthcare and to keep the insurance that they have.  On the 
other hand, poor women and women of color will lose ground in 
access to abortion, because the ACA prevents insurance payment for 
abortions through both public and private insurance.197  This new set 
of federal funding limits contradicts and undercuts the access-
enhancing goals of the ACA.  Further, by inviting state lawmakers to 
limit insurance coverage of abortion, the ACA amplifies existing 
barriers to women’s reproductive care and further detaches abortion 
from holistic treatment of women’s medical needs. 
The ACA is likely to exacerbate the class divide in abortion 
services.  Women with private health insurance who historically have 
had health plans that cover abortion will likely continue with this 
coverage.  But the millions of women who will rely on Medicaid and 
tax subsidies to pay for private insurance in the Exchanges will be 
subjected to the Hyde Amendment with no alternative but to sacrifice 
life necessities to access a legal, non-experimental medical procedure.  
 
 195. Mayhew v. Sebelius, No. 12–2059, 2012 WL 4762101 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 196. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 197. See Emily Spitzer, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe v. Wade: Let’s Start with the 
President’s Budget, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2013, 1:33 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emily-spitzer/hyde-amendment-
budget_b_2506668.html (Director of the National Health Law Program describing 
the disparate impact of federal spending decisions on poor women and women of 
color).   
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The NFIB federalism language provides protection to states that buck 
the anti-abortion tenor of the ACA, but it may also protect those 
states that have increased their abortion restrictions by preventing 
private insurance coverage of abortion.  Whether such state 
limitations will give rise to additional access problems remains to be 
seen.  In the meantime, women’s sexual health remains a political 
football. 
 
